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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant B.S. (“Mother”) is the natural mother of 
M.N. (“Daughter”), a minor child.  Mother had primary legal 
custody of Daughter until Daughter was removed from 
Mother’s care in accordance with a court order that 
transferred custody to the child’s natural father, E.N. 
(“Father”).  Mother claims that Somerset County (the 
“County”), along with Somerset County Children and Youth 
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Services and two of its employees, Julie Barth and Jessica 
Eller, (collectively, “Appellees”) violated her constitutional 
rights to substantive and procedural due process in securing 
and effectuating the transfer and related orders.  She seeks to 
redress those alleged constitutional violations under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and she is now appealing an order of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania that rejected her claims and entered summary 
judgment in Appellees’ favor.   
We agree with Mother that her procedural due process 
rights were violated by the Appellees, though the individual 
defendants are protected by absolute immunity.  As to the 
substantive due process claims, we conclude that the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment for the Appellees was 
correct, though for somewhat different reasons than those 
expressed by that Court.  We will therefore affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court’s order and will remand the 
case for a trial against the County on the damages Mother 
sustained when her procedural due process rights were 
violated. 
 
I. Background1
 
 
Daughter was born in June 2004 and suffered a variety 
of medical problems that stunted her growth.  In October 
2005, Mother took Daughter to a pediatric gastroenterologist 
                                              
1 Although our standard of review directs us to view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought, see infra Part II, we proceed at 
this point by reciting the undisputed facts.  
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named Dr. Douglas Lindblad, who diagnosed Daughter with 
failure to thrive.2
 
  After running various tests to determine the 
cause of her condition, Dr. Lindblad referred Daughter for 
inpatient treatment at the Children’s Institute of Pittsburgh 
(the “Children’s Institute”).   
She was treated there from March 20, 2006 to March 
26, 2006, and gained 50 grams per day during that time.  That 
weight gain was normal for a child of Daughter’s age in 
Daughter’s condition, reflecting what “[she] would have been 
expected to gain plus additional weight which would get … 
[her] to the point … where [she] should [have] be[en] in 
terms of growth.”  (Joint App. at 668; see id. at 669.)  
Daughter had not experienced normal growth before that 
time, having previously gained only 8 to 11 grams per day.  
Sadly, after concluding her inpatient treatment and returning 
to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only 4 grams per day, at 
least initially.   
 
A. Dr. Lindblad’s Child Abuse Report 
 
The “fact that [Daughter’s] weight gain when she was 
an inpatient … far exceeded her rate of weight gain at home” 
concerned Dr. Lindblad (id. at 139), and led him to attribute 
Daughter’s failure to thrive to how Mother was caring for her.  
                                              
2 Failure to thrive is a diagnosis that may be “based 
upon an objective finding that a child’s weight falls below the 
third percentile of weight of children of like age.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 15; see MedlinePlus Medical 
Encyclopedia, Failure to Thrive, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000991.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2012).) 
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Specifically, after examining Daughter on April 18, 2006, Dr. 
Lindblad concluded that Daughter’s failure to thrive was 
psychosocial, as opposed to physical, in origin.  Psychosocial 
failure to thrive occurs when a “child’s failure to thrive is due 
to some factors in the home that lead the child not to grow 
well,” and is “usually associated with inadequate caloric 
intake.”  (Id. at 670.)  Although psychosocial failure to thrive 
is not necessarily associated with neglect, Dr. Lindblad feared 
that Daughter was being neglected by Mother, and he further 
opined in his progress notes that he was “concerned about 
Munchausen by proxy.”3
 
  (Id. at 433.)   
As a result, Dr. Lindblad believed Daughter was in 
physical danger that justified reporting to state authorities his 
fear that Mother was neglecting Daughter, or worse.  But 
while Dr. Lindblad believed that action was warranted after 
seeing Daughter on April 18, 2006, he did not immediately 
make a report to “ChildLine,” the Pennsylvania state entity 
responsible for receiving reports of neglect and abuse.4
                                              
3 Munchausen by proxy “is a form of child abuse in 
which a parent induces real or apparent symptoms of a 
disease in a child.”  MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/001555.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). 
  
4 As detailed in Part I.C, infra, Pennsylvania provides 
a specific protocol for reporting and investigating child abuse.  
Under that statutory and regulatory framework, certain 
persons are required to report suspected abuse.  See 23 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6313(a) (“Reports from persons required 
to report … shall be made immediately by telephone and in 
writing within 48 hours after the oral report.”).  ChildLine is 
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Instead, his first contact with state authorities about 
Daughter’s case occurred on May 4, 2006, when he spoke 
with Jessica Eller.  Eller, a child welfare caseworker for 
Somerset County Children and Youth Services,5
                                                                                                     
the state entity that accepts such calls.  See Pennsylvania 
Department of Public Welfare, Child Line Abuse Registry, 
http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/provider/childwelfareservices 
/childlineandabuseregistry/index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
2012) (“The Mission of ChildLine is to accept calls … 24 
hours per day, seven days per week. …  The Intake Unit … is 
available … to receive reports of suspected child abuse.”). 
 was already 
5 Appellees acknowledge that Somerset County 
Children and Youth Services acts on behalf of Somerset 
County with respect to child protective services (see Joint 
App. at 77 (stating that Somerset County Children and Youth 
Services “perform[s] certain functions as permitted under 
state law regarding the protection of children in Somerset 
County”)), and have treated the liability of those two entities 
as being coextensive throughout the litigation in this case.  
See, e.g., W.D. Pa. ECF no. 08-30, doc. no. 50, at 2; 12-15 
(arguing that judgment should be entered “as to [Mother’s] 
claims against Somerset County and Somerset County CYS 
because there is no evidence of record of any unconstitutional 
custom, policy or practice,” and focusing exclusively on 
Somerset Children and Youth Services’ conduct in 
developing that contention).  We thus treat them as the same 
for purposes of our discussion and will generally refer to 
Somerset County and Somerset County Children and Youth 
Services collectively as “the County” throughout this opinion. 
7 
 
investigating Daughter’s case and had previously contacted 
Dr. Lindblad in connection with her investigation.6
 
   
Dr. Lindblad told Eller of the discrepancy between 
Daughter’s inpatient weight gain and her weight gain when 
under Mother’s care, explained his conclusion that 
Daughter’s failure to thrive was psychosocial in origin, and 
described his concern about Munchausen by proxy.  During 
that conversation, Eller “instructed Dr. Lindblad to [file] a 
ChildLine report” (id. at 311), which he did shortly thereafter.   
 
B. Eller’s Child Abuse Report 
 
At some point, Eller also made her own ChildLine 
report.7
                                              
6 Given the path this case has followed, there is some 
irony in how it began.  The County was initially contacted by 
Mother, who reported in December 2005 that she believed 
Father was not properly feeding Daughter when Daughter 
stayed at Father’s home.  Eller was assigned to the case, and 
met with Father in relation to her investigation.  During that 
meeting, Father described the difference between Daughter’s 
inpatient weight gain and her weight gain at home, which 
evidently prompted Eller to investigate whether Mother was 
being neglectful or abusive.   
  A description of Eller’s ChildLine report stated that 
7 The parties dispute whose report came first.  Mother 
implies that Eller’s ChildLine call was made on May 4, 2006 
while Dr. Lindblad waited until May 5, 2006 to make his 
ChildLine call.  Appellees, by contrast, state that Dr. Lindblad 
made his ChildLine report on the evening of May 4, 2006 
whereas Eller’s call was made on May 5, 2006.  The 
difference is immaterial to our decision. 
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she had opted to make the report after speaking with a referral 
source and consulting her supervisor, Julie Barth, and the 
report relayed much of the information Dr. Lindblad had told 
Eller.8
 
  After making her initial ChildLine report, Eller 
prepared a summary of her findings in Daughter’s case to 
present to a judge for the purpose of removing Daughter from 
Mother’s home.  Her summary, dated May 5, 2006, stated: 
[The County] received a referral on May 5, 
2006 alleging serious physical neglect of 
[Daughter] by … [Mother] … .  Childline [sic] 
contacted [the County] and an investigation has 
been initiated.  Allegations of the neglect are 
psycho-social failure to thrive.  [Daughter] is 
nearly 2 years old and is currently 19 pounds.  
She was gaining 8-10 grams of weight per day 
while being fed by her mother, until she entered 
the Children’s Institute due to concerns of low 
weight on March 20, 2006.  While at the 
Children’s Institute, [Daughter] gained 50 
grams of weight per day while still being fed by 
her mother under the supervision of the Institute 
staff.  Since her discharge on March 26, 2006 
[Daughter] is now gaining 4-5 grams of weight 
per day. 
 
[The County] believes that it would be 
contrary to the welfare of the child … to 
continue to reside with and have unsupervised 
                                              
8 The written summary of the ChildLine report did not, 
however, describe Dr. Lindblad’s Munchausen by proxy 
concern or attribute the reported information to Dr. Lindblad.   
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contact with … [Mother] until the outcome of 
the investigation is determined.  Therefore, the 
Agency is requesting that all visitation and 
contact between [Mother] and [Daughter] [be] 
supervised by the Agency pending the outcome 
of the investigation.  
(Joint App. at 467.)  Eller also prepared a corresponding court 
order to suspend Mother’s contact with Daughter and transfer 
the child to Father’s custody.9
 
   
According to Appellees, the information relayed in 
Eller’s summary “was based upon [a] good faith recall and 
reading of” Daughter’s medical records.  (Id. at 380.)  
However, the summary’s reference to Daughter’s weight 
being 19 pounds was mistaken, in light of her most recent 
weigh-ins.10
 
  Whether Eller was aware of any error in the 
summary is a matter of dispute, but, in any event, she took her 
prepared summary and court order to Judge Cascio of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, and presented 
them to him ex parte on May 5, 2006.  Judge Cascio reviewed 
Eller’s summary, and signed the proposed order, which 
provided as follows: 
                                              
9 Notwithstanding the prior allegations that Mother 
lodged against Father, see supra note 6, Mother does not now 
contest that he was fit to be a custodial parent. 
10 When Dr. Lindblad examined Daughter on April 18, 
2006, he recorded her weight as 9.2 kilograms, which is 
equivalent to 20.2 pounds.  In late April, Daughter was 
weighed by two other physicians, and her weight was 
recorded as being between 20 pounds and 21 pounds.   
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[D]ue to allegations of serious physical neglect 
which are under investigation by [the County], 
it is hereby ordered that all contact and 
visitation between … [Daughter] and … 
[Mother] … be supervised by [the County] 
pending the outcome of the investigation.  It is 
also ordered that [Daughter] shall reside with … 
[Father] … until the completion of the 
investigation and [Mother] shall conduct herself 
appropriately in all visitations with [Daughter], 
including no badgering or harassing the agency 
staff, belittleling [sic] any service providers or 
… [Father]. 
(Id. at 468.)  Judge Cascio’s order and Eller’s summary were 
each filed under case number 20-B Juvenile 2006.   
  
 C. Daughter’s Removal from Mother’s Home 
 
Armed with Judge Cascio’s order, Eller, along with a 
police officer, went to Mother’s home that same day and took 
Daughter from Mother.  Pennsylvania’s Child Protective 
Services Law (the “CPSL”) ordinarily requires that a follow-
up hearing be held within 72 hours of a child’s removal from 
a parent’s custody.11
                                              
11 Aimed at “encourag[ing] more complete reporting of 
suspected child abuse” and at protecting children from further 
abuse, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6302(b), the CPSL requires 
child abuse reports to be investigated and permits children to 
be taken into protective custody by the state, see id. § 6315.  
The statute provides, however, that any protective custody 
may not “be maintained longer than 72 hours without an 
  According to Appellees, however, they 
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were not required to schedule such a hearing because, 
although Daughter was removed from Mother, she was 
transferred to Father’s custody and not to the state’s custody.  
Indeed, as Eller explained it, although a post-removal hearing 
would normally be required within 72 hours after executing 
an order taking a child into the state’s custody, no hearing is 
required to comply with state law if the County merely 
“transfers custody” to another parent, because the County 
would not have “take[n] custody.”  (Joint App. at 292.)   
 
That view was also expressed by Natalie Hunt, the 
Assistant Director of Somerset County Children and Youth 
Services.  Explaining that the kind of transfer in custody that 
occurred in this case is employed when there is a fit parent 
who can take custody of the child, Hunt testified that “the 72-
hour-hearing requirement is [not] necessary” unless the 
County files a dependency petition to take custody of a minor.  
(Id. at 331.)  Caseworker supervisor, Douglas Walters, 
echoed Hunt’s testimony, stating that, for as long as he could 
remember, the County would simply contact a judge when it 
felt it “needed to get an order, obtain an order to stop contact 
until [the County] could investigate” (id. at 339-40), and that, 
in such circumstances, the “agency doesn’t schedule a 
hearing” (id. at 342).12
                                                                                                     
informal [court] hearing” as provided in the Juvenile Act.  Id. 
§ 6315(d).  Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act requires an “informal 
hearing [to] be held promptly by the court or master and not 
later than 72 hours after the child is placed in detention or 
shelter care to determine whether his detention or shelter care 
is required.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6332(a). 
  He said that, on average, the County 
12 In light of the CPSL’s requirements for follow-up 
hearings in cases in which protective custody is taken, we 
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asks a judge to restrict contact between a parent and a child in 
that manner five to ten times per year.   
 
Thus, because Appellees thought it unnecessary to 
hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were 
Daughter taken into state custody, no follow-up hearing was 
scheduled and Mother received no explanation of how to 
arrange for a hearing.  Instead, Eller simply presented Mother 
with Judge Cascio’s order and left with Daughter. 
 
D. Daughter’s Subsequent Weigh-Ins and Eller’s  
  Investigation 
 
Immediately after picking Daughter up on May 5th, 
Eller took her to a pediatrician at what the parties refer to as 
“Berlin Pediatrics.”13
                                                                                                     
understand Walters to have been referring to orders stopping 
contact between the parent and the child in which the state 
does not take custody of the child.   
  During that visit, Daughter’s weight 
was recorded as being 22 pounds, 2 ounces.  Daughter 
returned to Berlin Pediatrics with Father three days later, on 
May 8, 2006, and her weight was again recorded as 22 
pounds, 2 ounces.  The results of those two weigh-ins are 
13 Although the record is not entirely clear, we 
understand the references to “Berlin Pediatrics” to be a 
shorthand for the Somerset Pediatric and Adolescent Health 
Center in Berlin, Pennsylvania.  (See Joint App. at 710 
(Daughter’s “Berlin Pediatrics” growth chart with a stamp for 
the “Somerset Pediatric and Adolescent Health Center” in 
Berlin, Pennsylvania).)  We will employ that shorthand 
throughout this opinion. 
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highly significant because, as Dr. Lindblad explained during 
his deposition, they placed Daughter around the fifth 
percentile on the growth chart and would “not support a 
diagnosis of failure to thrive,” if the trend in growth they 
showed were to continue.14
 
  (Id. at 366-67.)  It did not.  When 
Daughter was weighed at Berlin Pediatrics on May 16, 2006, 
she was 20 pounds, 11 ounces. 
Eller, in the meantime, continued investigating 
Mother.  The result of her investigation was a June 19, 2006 
Child Protective Services Investigation report that found the 
allegations of neglect against Mother to be supported by 
substantial evidence.15
                                              
14 Based on the results of those weigh-ins, a physician 
retained by Mother opined that Daughter should not have 
been removed from Mother on May 5, 2006.  (See Joint App. 
at 695 (“It is unclear to me why the child was removed on a 
day when she showed significant weight gain for the first 
time while under the mother’s care.”).)  Dr. Lindblad offered 
similar testimony, stating he would likely not have called 
ChildLine if he was aware of Daughter’s May 5, 2006 weight.  
(See id. at 369 (Dr. Lindblad’s testimony that he likely 
“would have waited until another opportunity to examine the 
child for weight before calling the ChildLine,” if he had been 
aware of the May 5 weight of “22 pounds, 2 ounces”).)  As 
discussed in greater detail herein, the importance of 
Daughter’s May 5 and May 8 weights is contested because 
Appellees take the position that Daughter was, unlike on 
other occasions, wearing clothes when weighed.  See infra 
note 34. 
  Eller’s conclusion was based on her 
15 Under Pennsylvania state law, Eller was required to 
send “one copy of” that report form, known as “CY-48,” to 
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finding that Daughter had gained only 4 to 5 grams of weight 
per day while under Mother’s care following her discharge 
from inpatient treatment, compared to the 50 grams per day 
she gained while at the Children’s Institute and to the average 
of 40.5 grams per day she gained from May 16, 2006 to May 
30, 2006, while under Father’s care.   
 
Those findings were misleading, however, because 
they implied that Daughter’s first weigh-in under Father’s 
care occurred on May 16, 2006 and that Daughter weighed 
only 19 pounds, 10 ounces when she was initially placed in 
Father’s care on May 5, 2006.16
                                                                                                     
ChildLine “within 30 days of the receipt of an oral report of 
suspected abuse.”  (Joint App. at 455; see 55 Pa. Code 
§ 3490.67(a) (“The county agency shall send the Child 
Protective Service Investigation Report form (CY-48) to 
ChildLine within 30-calendar days of the receipt of the report 
of suspected child abuse.”).) 
  Eller’s report did not 
mention Daughter’s May 5 and May 8, 2006 weigh-ins at 
Berlin Pediatrics, because Eller treated them as invalid 
measurements.  She asserted that those weights are unreliable 
16 Specifically, Eller’s report stated that “[s]ince 
[Daughter’s] first weigh-in on May 16, 2006 [Daughter] has 
gained 481 grams of weight or on average of [sic] 18 grams 
of weight per day.”  (Joint App. at 456.)  Daughter’s May 16, 
2006 weight of 20 pounds, 11 ounces is equivalent to 331 
ounces or 9383.692 grams.  Thus, Eller’s assertion that 
Daughter had gained 481 grams implied that she had initially 
weighed in at 8902.692 grams, which is equivalent to 19 
pounds, 10.03 ounces.  
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because Daughter had been dressed when they were taken.17
 
  
By ignoring those data points, Eller was not forced to 
consider that Daughter may have gained significant weight 
while under Mother’s care before Daughter was removed on 
May 5, 2006, and that Daughter’s weight seemed to drop 
when she was first placed with Father.  
E. Mother’s Habeas Corpus Petition, and Judge  
  Cascio’s Orders in Connection With Eller’s  
  Report 
 
Before Eller’s June 19, 2006 Child Protective Services 
Investigation report was submitted to the state, Mother filed a 
habeas corpus petition in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Somerset County, arguing that the County had violated state 
law by not providing a hearing after removing Daughter from 
Mother’s custody.  Mother’s petition was filed under the 
same case number as the May 5, 2006 order removing 
Daughter from Mother’s custody, and a hearing was held 
before Judge Cascio on June 14, 2006.  At the hearing, which 
occurred 40 days after Daughter was removed from Mother’s 
custody, the County contested Mother’s petition by arguing 
                                              
17 Eller wrote “dress” next to the May 5 and May 8 
results on a copy of a growth chart prepared by Berlin 
Pediatrics.  She stated in her deposition that she observed that 
Daughter’s clothes were not removed when Daughter was 
weighed on May 5, and that Father informed her that 
Daughter was dressed for the weigh-in that occurred on May 
8.  Daughter’s pediatrician stated in his deposition, however, 
that the “standard practice” at Berlin Pediatrics was to weigh 
children such as Daughter “without their clothes.”  (Joint 
App. at 371.) 
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that it had no obligation to conduct a post-removal hearing 
because it had not taken custody of Daughter.  The hearing 
concluded with Judge Cascio’s taking Mother’s petition under 
advisement.     
 
Eller, as noted, completed and filed her Child 
Protective Services Investigation report five days later, on 
June 19, 2006.18
 
  Four days after that, on June 23, 2006, she 
met ex parte with Judge Cascio to present another summary 
to him that relayed her findings.  It stated:  
[The County] has completed the Child 
Protective Services investigation regarding 
serious physical neglect of [Daughter].  The 
[report] was filed on June 19, 2006 with 
Childline and substantiated [Mother] … as the 
perpetrator.  Due to the indicated status of the 
report [the County] is recommending that visits 
continue to be supervised between [Mother] and 
[Daughter] until further hearings on this matter 
are scheduled by either parent. 
 
(Id. at 712.)  As she had done before, Eller offered a proposed 
order to Judge Cascio, along with her summary.  After that 
                                              
18 Mother was ultimately advised by letter of the 
conclusion reached in Eller’s June 19, 2006 report.  The letter 
advised that Mother had the right to request that the report be 
amended or destroyed if she believed it was inaccurate.  She 
initiated proceedings to do that, but her request to expunge 
the report was denied.  Although Mother had the opportunity 
to appeal that decision and she initially sought to do so, she 
ultimately withdrew her appeal.   
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meeting, the Judge entered the following order which, with 
Eller’s summary, was filed on June 23, 2006 under the same 
case number as Mother’s habeas petition and the initial 
removal order had been: 
 
[D]ue to the indicated report of serious physical 
neglect whereby [Mother] is the perpetrator, it 
is hereby ordered that all visitation between 
[Mother] and [Daughter] continue to be 
supervised until further hearings on this matter 
are scheduled by either parent. 
 
(Id. at 713.)   
 
A few days later, on June 26, 2006, Judge Cascio 
entered an order denying Mother’s habeas corpus petition 
saying, among other things, that “[t]he child was not taken 
into protective custody so as to trigger the provisions and 
protections of the” CPSL; and that “[p]lacement of the child 
with her Father is necessary and appropriate considering the 
serious and continuing medical evidence of failure of the 
child to thrive while in Mother’s care.”  (Id. at 714-15.) 
 
Mother and Father subsequently embarked upon 
contentious custody proceedings, eventually receiving shared 
custody of Daughter.   
 
F. Procedural History 
 
On February 5, 2008, Mother initiated this lawsuit.  
She later filed an amended complaint asserting claims against 
Appellees for violating her substantive due process rights, as 
well as claims for violating her right to procedural due 
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process by transferring Daughter to Father’s custody without 
timely notice or an opportunity to be heard.19
 
  After the 
completion of discovery, Appellees filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Mother opposed that motion and moved 
for summary judgment on her procedural due process claim.  
Holding that the individual defendants were shielded by 
absolute or qualified immunity and that the County’s actions 
did not violate Mother’s constitutional rights, the District 
Court granted Appellees’ motion and denied Mother’s.  It 
entered judgment in Appellees’ favor the same day.   
This timely appeal followed.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 Because Mother challenges the process she received 
with respect to state court orders issued by Judge Cascio, we 
asked the parties to prepare letter-briefs on whether the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine affects our subject matter 
jurisdiction in this case.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (explaining that 
“federal courts of first instance” lack jurisdiction to “review 
and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments” (citing 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court 
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983))).  Appellees 
responded by arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 
Mother’s constitutional claims.  Mother, of course, argues 
that the doctrine “has absolutely no application” to any of her 
claims.  (Appellant’s Letter Mem. at 1.)   
                                              
19 Mother’s complaint also pleaded a First Amendment 
claim and a civil conspiracy claim, which she has abandoned 
on appeal. 
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In Great Western Mining & Mineral Company v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d. Cir. 2010), we surveyed 
recent caselaw and concluded that “there are four 
requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine to apply,” id. at 166, namely that “(1) the federal 
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of 
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those 
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; 
and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 
reject the state judgments,” id. (alterations in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
concluded that a federal claim alleging that the defendants 
conspired to engineer the plaintiff’s loss in state court 
proceedings was not barred by Rooker-Feldman because it 
did not “assert injury caused by state-court judgments and 
seek review and rejection of those judgments[.]”  Id. at 171.  
Because the injury Mother claims is likewise traceable to 
Appellees’ actions, as opposed to the state court orders those 
actions allegedly caused, we reject Appellees’ contention that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in this case.  Cf. id. at 166-67 (a father’s suit “for 
the return of his son on grounds that the state judgment 
violates his federal substantive due-process rights as a parent” 
is barred by Rooker-Feldman (quoting Hoblock v. Albany 
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005))).   
 
Having rejected Appellees’ invocation of the Rooker-
Feldman  doctrine, it is clear that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We, in turn, have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise “plenary 
review of [the] district court’s grant of summary judgment.”  
Funk v. CIGNA Grp. Life Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Accordingly, we view the facts in Mother’s favor to 
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determine whether the District Court correctly held that 
“there [was] no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
[that Appellees were] entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Because Mother challenges the 
District Court’s decision to deny her summary judgment on 
her procedural due process claim, we must also view the facts 
in the light most favorable to Appellees to determine whether 
the District Court correctly determined that Mother was not 
entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV.  “As [the] concept [of due process] has developed, it has 
come to have both substantive and procedural components.”  
Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 658 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Mother contends that Appellees violated both 
components when they removed Daughter from her home and 
transferred the child to Father’s custody, and she thus seeks 
redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20
                                              
20 Section 1983 permits a cause of action against 
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws [of the United States] … .”  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
  According to Mother, 
the District Court erred by entering judgment in Appellees’ 
favor on the substantive due process claim, and by failing to 
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enter a judgment recognizing that Appellees violated her 
procedural due process rights.  She asks, therefore, that we 
vacate the District Court’s order and remand the case for 
entry of judgment on her procedural due process claim, and 
for a trial on her substantive due process claim and on the 
damages attendant to her procedural due process claim.   
 
Appellees respond that the District Court appropriately 
entered judgment in their favor because their actions did not 
violate Mother’s due process rights.  They further contend 
that, in any event, Eller and Barth cannot be liable because 
they are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for all 
claims against them.  In addition, although Appellees have 
not pressed the issue in their briefing before us, they argued 
to the District Court that the County cannot be liable because 
it is a municipal entity and not culpable for the acts of its 
agents, and, if true, that would be a basis for affirming the 
District Court’s judgment as to the claims against the 
County.21
                                              
21 As discussed at greater length herein, liability under 
§ 1983 “attaches to a municipality only when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”  Andrews v. 
City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted); see Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Social Servs. For 
Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1096 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The 
defendants … now argue that summary judgment should be 
affirmed on the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of 
action against them under section 1983, because municipal 
liability cannot be based upon respondeat superior … .”). 
  Cf. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 282 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e can affirm based on any grounds 
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supported by the record.”).  We consider first whether Eller 
and Barth are liable to Mother for any procedural or 
substantive due process violations, and then we address the 
County’s liability for those claims.   
 
A. Due Process Claims Against Eller and Barth 
 
 1.   Absolute Immunity in the Child Welfare  
   Context22
 
 
Although the Supreme Court has made clear that 
“[m]ost public officials are entitled only to qualified 
immunity,” it has recognized that “public officials who 
perform ‘special functions,’” such as prosecutors, are 
sometimes entitled to absolute immunity.  Yarris v. Cnty. of 
Del., 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)).  The purpose of 
according absolute immunity to such officials is to ensure that 
they “can perform their respective functions without 
                                              
22 Unlike a qualified immunity analysis, which often 
involves an initial inquiry into whether the facts alleged show 
a violation of a constitutional right, see Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 232-36 (2009) (concluding that it is often 
appropriate, although not mandatory, for a court to first 
consider whether the facts alleged show a violation of a 
constitutional right before reaching the qualified immunity 
issue), the question of absolute immunity can be addressed as 
a threshold issue.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 
(1985) (concluding first that the Attorney General was not 
entitled to absolute immunity for his conduct before turning 
to the question of whether a constitutional right had been 
violated).  
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harassment or intimidation.”  Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.  
Although conferring absolute immunity obliges courts to 
sometimes deny relief to those “with valid claims against 
dishonest or malicious government officials,” Snell v. 
Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir. 1990), the underlying 
logic is that it is ultimately “better to leave unredressed the 
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who 
try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation,” 
Yarris, 465 F.3d at 135 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Still, absolute immunity is “strong medicine, justified 
only when the danger of [officials’ being] deflect[ed from the 
effective performance of their duties] is very great.”  
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988) (alterations in 
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, officials who “seek exemption from personal 
liability” on that basis bear “the burden of showing that such 
an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of 
public policy.”  Id. at 224.  Thus, “[i]n light of the Supreme 
Court’s ‘quite sparing’ recognition of absolute immunity …, 
we begin with [a] presumption that qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is appropriate,” unless the official 
invoking absolute immunity meets a “heavy burden of 
establishing entitlement” to it.  Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 
207-08 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).   
 
Appellees contend that they have met that burden here 
because Eller and Barth performed “actions … closely 
analogous to those of prosecutors.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 39.)  
As Appellees correctly point out, we have recognized that the 
justifications for according absolute immunity to prosecutors 
sometimes apply to child welfare employees.  Specifically, in 
24 
 
Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 
486 (3d Cir. 1997), we joined several of our sister circuits in 
deeming “child welfare workers and attorneys who prosecute 
dependency proceedings on behalf of the state … absolute[ly] 
immun[e] from suit for all of their actions in preparing for 
and prosecuting such dependency proceedings.”  Id. at 488-
89.  The plaintiff in that case was the grandmother of a minor 
child for whom she was the sole legal guardian.  Id. at 489.  
After receiving a report that the child had an extreme and 
unhealthy attachment to the grandmother, an employee of a 
state child welfare agency initiated emergency dependency 
proceedings to remove the child from the grandmother’s 
custody and commit her to the custody of the state.  Id.  An 
immediate detention hearing was held, at which a state judge 
ordered that the child be placed in a psychiatric institution for 
a complete evaluation.  Id.  The state child welfare agency 
assumed custody of the child, and a legal battle between the 
agency and the plaintiff ensued.  Id.   
 
The plaintiff eventually filed suit under § 1983 
alleging, inter alia, due process claims against various agency 
caseworkers and a private attorney who had represented the 
agency throughout the dependency proceedings.  On appeal, 
we considered whether those defendants were “entitled to 
absolute immunity for their actions in petitioning and in 
formulating and making recommendations to the state court.”  
Id. at 493.  We began our analysis by noting that § 1983 “did 
not abolish long-standing common law immunities from civil 
suits,” id., including those against individuals who hold 
offices that did not exist at common law but who perform 
tasks “analogous to functions performed by those who were 
immune at common law,” id. at 494.  Drawing on the 
Supreme Court’s extension of absolute immunity to 
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prosecutors, we held that absolute immunity cloaked state 
child welfare caseworkers from liability with respect to “their 
actions on behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and 
prosecuting dependency proceedings.”  Id. at 495.  We 
clarified that such immunity was broad enough “to include 
the formulation and presentation of recommendations to the 
court in the course of such proceedings” id., but we also said 
that “we would be unwilling to accord absolute immunity to 
‘investigative or administrative’ actions taken … outside the 
context of a judicial proceeding,” id. at 497 n.7. 
 
Our holding, as we explained it, was premised on three 
parallels between child welfare employees and prosecutors: 
 
(1) the functions performed by [state child 
welfare caseworkers] in dependency 
proceedings are closely analogous to the 
functions performed by prosecutors in criminal 
proceedings; (2) the public policy 
considerations that countenance immunity for 
prosecutors are applicable to child welfare 
workers performing these functions; and (3) 
dependency proceedings incorporate important 
safeguards that protect citizens from 
unconstitutional actions by child welfare 
workers. 
 
Id.  at 495.  As to the first point, we observed that, like 
prosecutors, “social worker[s] must make a quick decision 
based on perhaps incomplete information as to whether to 
commence investigations and initiate proceedings against 
parents who may have abused their children.”  Id. at 496 
(quoting Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
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812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Regarding the applicable public policy 
considerations, we noted that, much like prosecutors, child 
welfare workers “acting in a quasi-prosecutorial capacity in 
dependency proceedings” are forced to “exercise independent 
judgment” that should not be compromised by exposing them 
to the potentially chilling effect of § 1983 liability.  Id. at 496.  
Finally, we gave two reasons why § 1983 liability was not the 
only mechanism available to protect the public against 
unconstitutional conduct: 
 
First, the judicial process itself provides 
significant protection.  Child welfare workers 
must seek an adjudication of dependency from a 
neutral judge whose decisions are guided by the 
“best interests of the child” and subject to 
appellate review.  Second, although child 
welfare workers are not subject to the 
comprehensive system of professional 
responsibility applicable to prosecutors, they are 
under the supervision of the agency that 
employs them.  The agency has an incentive to 
ensure that its employees do not violate 
constitutional rights because it is not immune 
from suit for abuses committed by employees 
with policy-making authority or acting pursuant 
to agency policy or custom. 
Id. at 497 (citation omitted).  Because the plaintiff’s claims 
against the state child welfare workers arose “in connection 
with the formulation and presentation of recommendations to 
the state court regarding [the child’s] dependency status and 
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disposition,” we deemed those workers entitled to absolute 
immunity.  Id.   
 
We likewise extended that immunity to the private 
attorney who had represented the agency, because the 
attorney had – like the agency’s employees – taken action “on 
behalf of the State that [was] integrally related to the judicial 
process.”  Id. at 502; see also id. at 504.  Notably, we did so 
even though the attorney’s allegedly unlawful actions 
occurred after the attorney had been ordered removed from 
serving on the agency’s behalf and had been undertaken with 
a subjectively malicious intent.  Id. at 503; see also id. (“It is 
true that Ernst alleged, and the court found, that [the attorney] 
… filed this petition because of hostility to Ernst rather than 
for the purpose of serving the best interest of [the child].”).  
Reasoning that the immunity analysis was to be undertaken 
“without reference to the official’s subjective state of mind,” 
id. at 502, we concluded that absolute immunity could protect 
the attorney from liability flowing from prosecutorial actions, 
as long as the challenged acts were not those that “a 
reasonable [person] would recognize as being clearly outside 
his jurisdiction,” id. at 502 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Because “a reasonable attorney in [the 
attorney]’s position could have concluded that she owed a 
duty to her client,” since a new lawyer had not been 
appointed to replace her at the time of the challenged conduct, 
we held that she “did not act in a clear absence of authority” 
and was therefore entitled to absolute immunity.  Id. at 504. 
 
Appellees claim that the requests for orders pertaining 
to Mother’s custodial rights are entitled to absolute immunity 
under Ernst because they constitute protected advocacy.  (See 
Appellees’ Br. at 42 (“Requesting … an order is ‘petitioning’ 
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the court, and providing any testimony constitutes ‘making 
recommendations to the state court’ and/or ‘acting as an 
advocate in judicial proceedings’ … .”).)  The District Court 
accepted that argument, understanding our precedent in Ernst 
to mean that “there must be a judicial court order before … 
social workers … [may] receive absolute immunity.”  (Joint 
App. at 24.)  The District Court was satisfied that, in this 
case, that prerequisite was effectively satisfied because “the 
acts [Eller and Barth] performed in seeking a judicial order 
transferring custody from the Natural Mother to the Natural 
Father were closely associated with the judicial process.”  (Id. 
at 25.)   
 
Mother argues that the District Court ignored that, in 
this case, unlike in Ernst, dependency proceedings were never 
initiated; the County instead requested that the Court issue an 
order in response to a caseworker’s summary23 and, in so 
doing, avoided affording Mother automatic process under 
state law.24
                                              
23 Appellees refer to this process as a “Summary and 
Order procedure.” (See, e.g., Appellees’ Br. at 23.) 
  Thus, she argues, the checks on unconstitutional 
conduct that were part of the justification for extending 
24 There is a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” quality to 
the Appellees’ assertion that, on the one hand, the lack of 
dependency proceedings means there was no obligation to 
afford Mother a prompt post-removal hearing, see supra Part 
I.C, while, on the other hand, the alleged similarity between 
the County’s Summary and Order procedure and dependency 
proceedings means that Eller and Barth should be absolutely 
immune.  We reach our holding in spite of and not because of 
that somewhat inconsistent line of argument. 
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absolute immunity in that case simply do not exist here.  See 
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 497 (“Finally, as with prosecutors, there 
are alternative mechanisms other than the threat of § 1983 
liability that protect the public against unconstitutional 
conduct by child welfare workers.”).   
 
That argument is not without logical force.  The 
availability of “alternatives to damages suits against the 
official as [a] means of redressing wrongful conduct” is a 
factor that we must consider when assessing whether a 
government official is entitled to absolute immunity.  
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
id. (“Three factors determine whether a government official 
should be given absolute immunity for a particular function: 
1) whether there is a historical or common law basis for the 
immunity in question; 2) whether performance of the function 
poses a risk of harassment or vexatious litigation against the 
official; and 3) whether there exist alternatives to damage 
suits against the official as means of redressing wrongful 
conduct.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. 
Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (“Because the[] features of the judicial 
process tend to enhance the reliability of information and the 
impartiality of the decisionmaking process, there is a less 
pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional 
error.”).   
 
Ultimately, however, Mother’s contention is 
overstated.  As a careful comparison of this case to Ernst 
reveals, the same sorts of protection we identified there 
actually do apply here with respect to the caseworkers’ 
function of seeking judicial orders related to custody of 
Daughter.  First, as is true of dependency proceedings, “the 
judicial process itself” provided some check against wrongful 
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conduct under the procedure the County employed in 
removing Daughter from Mother’s home.  Ernst, 108 F.3d at 
497.  Although the County’s protocol did not include the 
post-removal hearing that dependency proceedings include, 
Daughter’s removal was nevertheless effectuated only after 
Eller presented her findings to “a neutral judge whose 
decisions [were] guided by [Daughter’s] best interests.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, even without 
following the protocols for removing a child in dependency 
proceedings, the agency in this case had the incentive we 
described in Ernst “to ensure that its employees do not violate 
constitutional rights because it is not immune from suit for 
abuses committed by employees with policy-making 
authority or acting pursuant to agency policy or custom.”  Id.  
Thus, although Ernst is certainly distinguishable in that 
absolute immunity was available to child welfare workers 
“for their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for, 
initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings,” id. at 
495 (emphasis added), that distinction is not dispositive as far 
as the availability of “important safeguards that protect 
citizens from unconstitutional actions” goes.  Id.  
 
Nor is Mother’s argument persuasive as to the 
“functions performed” or the “public policy considerations” 
we identified in Ernst.  Id.  Like caseworkers who present 
their findings during dependency proceedings, the 
caseworkers here were forced to act quickly to protect a child 
from perceived neglect or abuse and had to exercise 
independent judgment in doing so.  See id. at 496-97.  After 
speaking with Dr. Lindblad, Eller discussed the matter with 
Barth and decided it was necessary to initiate a ChildLine 
report so as to “report allegations of serious physical neglect” 
(Joint App. at 463), that would enable her to promptly secure 
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a court order to have Daughter removed from Mother’s care 
and to protect Daughter from further abuse.  The specter of 
§ 1983 liability in future cases could well impede the ability 
of Eller and others in her position to take action in an 
emergency.  We therefore believe that Ernst’s absolute 
immunity for child welfare employees is appropriate when 
the employee in question “formulat[es] and present[s] … 
recommendations to the court” with respect to a child’s 
custody determination, even if those recommendations are 
made outside the context of a dependency proceeding.25
 
  
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495.   
Having determined that the absence of dependency 
proceedings is not, in itself, a basis for resolving the absolute 
immunity question, we must now consider whether Eller and 
Barth were, in fact, formulating and presenting 
recommendations to a court when they undertook the conduct 
of which Mother complains.  In other words, we need to 
ascertain whether Eller and Barth “function[ed] as the state’s 
advocate when performing the action(s)” that gave rise to the 
due process violations Mother seeks to redress, or whether 
those claims instead arose from unprotected “administrative 
or investigatory actions.”  Odd, 538 F.3d at 208; see Ernst, 
108 F.3d at 495, 497 n.7 (noting immunity for caseworkers 
                                              
25 The dissent contends that the absence of dependency 
proceedings requires that we deny absolute immunity.  That, 
however, would unnecessarily convert what is a feature of 
some immunity cases into a prerequisite for immunity in all 
child welfare cases.  Our focus should be, instead, on whether 
the function of the child welfare worker, while engaged in the 
challenged act, was prosecutorial.  See Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495 
(emphasizing the import of the function performed).   
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includes “the formulation and presentation of 
recommendations to the court” but that we would not “accord 
absolute immunity to ‘investigative or administrative’ actions 
taken … outside the context of a judicial proceeding”).  The 
question is “what function … th[eir] act[s] served,” 
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2011).  We 
address that question first with regard to the acts underlying 
the alleged procedural due process violations, and then turn to 
the substantive due process claims. 
 
  2. Procedural Due Process  
The procedural due process claims arose when Eller 
and Barth, with the County’s approbation, removed Daughter 
from Mother’s custody by presenting ex parte conclusions 
about Daughter’s welfare to Judge Cascio on May 5, 2006, 
and perpetuated that removal through a second ex parte 
meeting on June 23, 2006. 26
                                              
26 We address the procedural due process claims 
against the County infra Part III.B.  Here, for purposes of the 
absolute immunity determination, we address only those 
claims against Eller and Barth. 
  In each of those meetings, Eller, 
on behalf of the County and under Barth’s supervision, 
recommended  that the court issue an order depriving Mother 
of custody of Daughter.  Such actions are “intimately 
associated with the judicial process in much the same way as 
are a prosecutor’s actions in representing the state in criminal 
prosecutions.” Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Inasmuch as their acts were fundamentally 
prosecutorial, in the manner described in Ernst, we conclude 
that Eller and Barth are absolutely immune from liability with 
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respect to the procedural due process claims.27
                                              
27 Our dissenting colleague argues that there can be no 
absolute immunity for the procedural due process claims 
because the caseworkers lacked “statutory authorization to 
approach the judge to request” the orders.  (Dissent at 4; see 
id. at 16 (discussing the second ex parte meeting).)  That 
authorization was lacking, he claims, because the caseworkers 
“merely initiat[ed] a custody process between parents,” a 
process not included in the statutorily permitted 
circumstances under which caseworkers can seek a removal 
order.  (Id. at 7.)  It is certainly true that absolute immunity 
does not protect acts in a “complete and clear absence of 
authority.”  Snell, 920 F.2d at 694.  The question of whether 
an act can be so characterized, however, is assessed from the 
perspective of the objectively reasonable caseworker, 
“without reference to the official’s subjective state of mind.”  
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 502.  We disagree with the suggestion in 
the dissent that the caseworkers here could not have 
reasonably believed their actions were in furtherance of their 
authority.  In Ernst, we determined that the lawyer who had 
been removed from serving on the agency’s behalf “did not 
act in a clear absence of authority” because she could have 
reasonably “concluded that she owed a duty to her client” 
under the circumstances.  Id. at 504.  So too here. There can 
be no question that it was proper for the caseworkers to 
endeavor to protect Daughter, see 55 Pa. Code § 3490.53(b) 
(“The county agency shall protect the safety of the subject 
child and other children in the home … and shall provide or 
arrange appropriate services when necessary during the 
investigation period.”), and the purpose of both the May 5 
   See id. at 495 
(according immunity for “the formulation and presentation of 
recommendations to the court”). 
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 3. The Substantive Due Process Claim 
 
That, however, does not definitively settle the absolute 
immunity question in this case, because the substantive due 
process claim with respect to Eller remains to be addressed.28
                                                                                                     
and June 23 orders was to do just that.  Even if Pennsylvania 
law requires that purpose to be effectuated by other means 
than the procedure undertaken here, it cannot be persuasively 
said that a reasonable caseworker would believe that she had 
acted “in a clear absence of authority” in procuring the May 5 
and June 23 orders.  Ernst, 108 F.3d at 504. 
  
28 Although Mother brings this claim against all of the 
Appellees, she fails to identify any action by Barth that 
amounts to a substantive due process violation, instead 
focusing entirely on Eller’s conduct.  (See Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 58 (“[A] jury could conclude that Eller was 
deliberately indifferent … and … acted in a grossly negligent 
manner.” (emphasis added)); id. at 61 (“[A] jury could find 
that Eller’s conduct shocks the conscience … .” (emphasis 
added)).)  We conclude, therefore, that Mother has waived 
any challenge to the District Court’s ruling that Barth is 
entitled to summary judgment on the substantive due process 
claim.  See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 
193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We have held on numerous 
occasions that [a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in 
its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference 
to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  We address the County’s substantive due 
process liability infra Part III.B, and thus address only Eller’s 
substantive due process liability here.       
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Mother contends that that claim arose when Eller removed 
Daughter on May 5, 2006, based on misrepresented medical 
evidence (see Appellant’s Opening Br. at 52 (arguing that 
Eller “concoct[ed] facts to convince Judge Cascio that he 
should permit the separation of Daughter from Mother 
coupled with the absence of information, which would justify 
removal”)), and when Eller subsequently “manipulat[ed] [the] 
evidence associated with the ChildLine report investigation” 
and presented that report’s conclusions to Judge Cascio on 
June 23, 2006, as the basis for her recommendation that 
Mother not regain custody of Daughter (id.).  As the 
immunity analysis hinges on the specific function served by 
Eller’s actions, we address each of those actions in turn. 
 
  a. Daughter’s Initial Removal 
 
Mother contends that Eller’s initial removal of 
Daughter on May 5, 2006 constitutes a substantive due 
process violation because Eller improperly relied on a report 
from Dr. Lindblad and misrepresented Daughter’s weight on 
the summary she prepared for Judge Cascio.  That claim 
presents a difficult immunity issue.  Although Eller 
eventually presented her recommendations to a court, and is 
entitled to absolute immunity for that under Ernst, her 
solicitation of information from Dr. Lindblad and the 
compilation of her findings into an abuse report occurred 
prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings.  See Ernst, 108 
F.3d at 497 (holding that “formulation and presentation of 
recommendations to the state” is entitled to absolute 
immunity, but declining to accord immunity to “investigative 
or administrative” actions (citation omitted)).  Mother’s claim 
thus raises the question of precisely where to draw the line 
between a child welfare employee’s investigative and 
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prosecutorial functions, an issue that is not clearly addressed 
by our holding in Ernst.   
 
But we do not need to answer that question today 
because, even if we were to conclude that Eller was not 
entitled to absolute immunity, no rational jury could find that 
her initial removal of Daughter violated Mother’s substantive 
due process rights.  In Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 
368 (3d Cir. 1999), we held that a substantive due process 
claim requires “decision-making by a social worker that is so 
clearly arbitrary … [that it] can properly be said to ‘shock the 
conscience.’” Id. at 376;  see also Croft v. Westmoreland 
Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1124–26 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  In so holding, we observed that “[t]he exact 
degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the ‘conscience-
shocking’ level depends upon the circumstances of a 
particular case,” because a “higher fault standard is proper 
when a government official is acting instantaneously and 
making pressured decisions without the ability to fully 
consider their risks.” Miller, 174 F.3d at 375.  In such 
situations, the “standard of culpability” necessary for a child 
welfare employee’s actions to shock the conscience must 
generally “exceed both negligence and deliberate 
indifference.”  Id.   
 
Eller’s actions on May 5 may not be free from fault, 
but they cannot be said to shock the conscience.  When Eller 
removed Daughter on May 5, she acted quickly upon 
information from a physician who had been treating Daughter 
over the course of several months.  Dr. Lindblad told Eller of 
medical evidence that indicated serious neglect.  Although he 
had not seen Daughter for approximately two-and-a-half 
weeks, Dr. Lindblad knew enough about her case to cogently 
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describe the discrepancy between her growth during her 
inpatient care at the Children’s Institute as compared with her 
growth under Mother’s care.  Based on Eller’s discussion 
with Dr. Lindblad, it was reasonable to take the steps she did 
to protect Daughter from Mother until there had been time to 
investigate further.  Considered in that context, Eller’s 
misstatement that Daughter weighed 19 pounds, see supra 
note 16 and accompanying text, cannot be viewed as more 
than mere negligence, especially because the material facts 
relayed by Dr. Lindblad that led Eller to act were all 
accurately stated in her summary to Judge Cascio. We 
conclude, therefore, that no rational jury could find that 
Eller’s actions leading to the May 5 removal of Daughter 
infringed upon Mother’s substantive due process rights. 
 
  b. Eller’s Subsequent Actions 
 
Mother next argues that the way Eller handled her 
subsequent investigation and report could support a jury 
verdict in Mother’s favor on the substantive due process 
claim.  Specifically, Mother argues that Eller excluded from 
her analysis the May 5 and May 8 weigh-ins, which suggested 
that Daughter had improved under Mother’s care.  According 
to Mother, that omission demonstrates that Eller acted either 
with a desire to manipulate the evidence or with deliberate 
indifference to the truth, either of which would be sufficient 
to support a jury verdict in her favor on the substantive due 
process claim.  
 
To resolve whether Eller is absolutely immune from 
liability with respect to that claim, we turn to the question of  
“what function (prosecutorial, administrative, investigative, 
or something else entirely)” the acts of preparing the report 
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and presenting its conclusion to Judge Cascio served.29
                                              
29 We reach this issue with regard to this claim, unlike 
with the claim arising from Eller’s May 5 conduct, because 
Mother has a much stronger case that her substantive due 
process rights were violated by Eller’s subsequent actions.   
Eller’s failure to mention the May 5 and May 8 weigh-ins in 
her report, combined with evidence in the record that she had 
a contentious relationship with Mother (see Joint App. at 310 
(describing how Eller found Mother “very offensive from the 
beginning of [their] relationship”)), could potentially, upon 
further analysis, support a determination that a rational jury 
might conclude that her behavior shocked the conscience.  
Thus, we must address whether Eller’s conduct is protected 
by absolute immunity.   
  
Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 332.  That mode of analysis does not 
lend itself to easy resolution in this case.  Although Eller 
“present[ed]” her “formulat[ed]” conclusions to Judge Cascio, 
which could entitle her to absolute immunity, Ernst, 108 F.3d 
at 495, the conclusions she reported were derived from the 
abuse report she prepared for the state which, on its own, 
plainly would not, see id. at 497 n.7 (“[W]e would be 
unwilling to accord absolute immunity to investigative … 
actions taken … outside the context of a judicial proceeding” 
(emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  There 
would, in fact, be no serious basis for Eller to posit that she 
acted as a quasi-prosecutor had she never secured a temporary 
removal order from Judge Cascio or presented her report’s 
conclusions to Judge Cascio after filing the report with the 
state, because her function in investigating potential child 
abuse and preparing a report required under state law does not 
approximate legal advocacy.  See Holloway v. Brush, 220 
F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ocial workers are 
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absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity 
as legal advocates – initiating court actions or testifying 
under oath – not when they are performing administrative, 
investigative, or other functions.”). 
 
But the presence of an investigative component to 
Eller’s conduct does not bar the application of absolute 
immunity when the function of her actions is still 
fundamentally prosecutorial in nature.  In Ernst, we noted that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea that 
absolute prosecutorial immunity extends only to the act of 
initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom.”  
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 497 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Rather, absolute immunity can protect acts 
undertaken “in prepar[ation] for the initiation of judicial 
proceedings,” so long as they fall within a prosecutor’s “role 
as an advocate for the state.” Id. at 497–98 (citation omitted).  
Extending that reasoning to apply to child welfare employees, 
we concluded in Ernst that absolute immunity protects not 
only caseworkers’ presentations of their recommendations to 
a court, but also their “gathering and evaluation of 
information” to formulate those recommendations and to 
prepare for judicial proceedings.   Id. at 498.  To hold 
otherwise, we explained, would expose caseworkers to 
liability “for the observations and judgments that were the 
necessary predicate” for their protected recommendations, 
which would “eviscerate the immunity they did receive and 
undermine the purposes sought to be advanced by the grant of 
absolute immunity.” Id. 
 
Here, the further investigation that Eller undertook 
after Judge Cascio’s initial order, and the subsequent 
ChildLine report that Eller filed, were part of an ongoing 
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judicial proceeding throughout which she served as an 
advocate for the state.  As described above, see supra Part 
III.A.2, Eller assumed a fundamentally prosecutorial role 
during the May 5 hearing, arguing on behalf of the County for 
Daughter’s removal from Mother’s care.  Following that 
initial removal, Eller undertook her investigation with the 
understanding that her conclusions would be considered in a 
subsequent custody determination.  Judge Cascio’s May 5 
order placed Daughter in Father’s custody only “until the 
completion of the investigation,” indicating that a second 
determination would be made “pending [its] result.” (Joint 
App. at 468.)  During the June 23 hearing, when that second 
determination was made, Eller again represented the County 
in recommending that the temporary change of custody be 
made permanent.  Her investigation was thus conducted in the 
context of an open judicial proceeding, throughout which her 
overall role was analogous to that of a prosecutor. See Ernst, 
108 F.3d at 496 (establishing that caseworkers’ actions are 
protected to the extent that they are “intimately associated 
with the judicial process in much the same way as are a 
prosecutor’s actions in representing the state in criminal 
prosecutions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
In addition to serving in a prosecutorial capacity, 
Eller’s specific actions were akin to a prosecutor’s 
preparations for trial. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 
259, 273 (1993) (“[T]he actions of a prosecutor are not 
absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a 
prosecutor.”).  During her investigation, Eller was “gathering 
and evaluat[ing] information” in preparation for an upcoming 
judicial proceeding, see Ernst at 498 (extending absolute 
immunity to such preparations),  and the observations and 
judgments compiled in her ChildLine report served as the 
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basis for her recommendations to Judge Cascio on June 23, 
2006.  In Ernst, we expressed concern that excluding such 
“observations and judgments” from immunity when they 
form the “necessary predicate” for protected 
recommendations would “undermine the purposes sought to 
be advanced by the grant of absolute immunity.” Id.  That 
concern is similarly implicated here.  If we protect Eller when 
she presents her recommendations to a judge, but allow her to 
be sued for preparing the report that she intends to present, 
absolute immunity has offered her no real protection; she will 
still have to defend in court the basis for her decision to 
recommend removal.  Cf. Yarris, 465 F.3d at 135 (concluding  
that it is “better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by 
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their 
duty to the constant dread of retaliation” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
We therefore conclude that Eller’s actions are 
protected by absolute immunity with respect to Mother’s 
substantive due process claim.  We emphasize, however, as 
we did in Ernst, that this holding does not insulate from 
liability all actions taken by child welfare caseworkers.  See 
id. at 497 n.7 (“[W]e would be unwilling to accord absolute 
immunity to investigative or administrative actions taken by 
child welfare workers outside the context of a judicial 
proceeding.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Investigations conducted outside of the context of judicial 
proceedings may still be susceptible to due process claims.  
Nor can caseworkers shield their investigatory work from 
review merely by seeking a court order at some point.  See 
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (“[A] prosecutor may not shield his 
investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity 
merely because … that work may be retrospectively 
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described as ‘preparation’ … .” (citation omitted)).  The key 
to the absolute immunity determination is not the timing of 
the investigation relative to a judicial proceeding, but rather 
the underlying function that the investigation serves and the 
role the caseworker occupies in carrying it out.  See 
Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 332 (“The court must ascertain … 
what conduct forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of 
action, and … then determine what function … that act 
served.”).  Here, Eller advocated on behalf of the County in 
the May 5 meeting and continued in that role through the June 
23 custody determination.  Because the underlying function 
of her actions throughout that judicial proceeding – including 
during the investigation and composition of the report – was 
fundamentally prosecutorial in nature, she is entitled to 
absolute immunity for this claim.    
 
B. Due Process Claims Against the County 
 
Having concluded that none of the claims against Eller 
and Barth are viable, we turn now to Mother’s due process 
claims against the County.  Mother contends that the County 
violated her procedural due process rights by failing to afford 
her a prompt post-removal hearing after Daughter was 
removed from her custody on May 5, 2006, and through 
Eller’s actions in meeting ex parte with Judge Cascio on June 
23, 2006, and providing him with what Mother alleges is false 
information about her treatment of Daughter.  She also argues 
that the County violated her substantive due process rights 
because Daughter’s removal was based on Eller’s 
“concoct[ed] facts” and “manipulate[ed] … evidence.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 52.) 
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 1. Failure to Provide a Post-Removal  
   Hearing 
 
Due process is implicated when protected interests 
such as a parent’s liberty interest “in the custody, care and 
management of [his or her] children” are subjected to 
intrusion by the state.  Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125.  An individual 
must ordinarily be afforded “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’” before any 
such intrusion.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
(1965)).  The extent of that obligation is, as the Supreme 
Court has instructed, a flexible one, based upon a balance of 
several factors: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
Id. at 335.  Thus, when a parent complains of state action 
intruding on the “parent-child relationship,” the parent’s 
interest must “be balanced against the state’s interest in 
protecting children suspected of being abused.”  Miller, 174 
F.3d at 373.  While the question of what constitutes due 
process is necessarily rooted in the circumstances of a given 
case, it is axiomatic that at least some process is required 
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when a “state seeks to alter, terminate, or suspend a parent’s 
right to the custody of [her] minor children.”  McCurdy v. 
Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 827 (3d Cir. 2003).     
 
Mother, as noted, argues that her procedural due 
process rights were violated here because she was afforded no 
hearing when Daughter was removed through the County’s 
practice of transferring custody to another guardian.  See 
supra Part I.C.  Indeed, Mother’s first opportunity to protest 
her Daughter’s removal was when she appeared before Judge 
Cascio 40 days later in connection with the habeas corpus 
proceedings that she herself had initiated.   
 
Adopting the arguments of the Appellees, the District 
Court concluded that Mother’s procedural due process rights 
were not violated.  It reasoned that the May 5, 2006 order 
“did not terminate all parental custody rights” but instead 
“transferred primary custody from the Natural Mother to the 
Natural Father and provided for supervised visitation of the 
Natural Mother with the Minor Child.”  (Joint App. at 36.)  
The Court further concluded that Mother was “receiving and 
has received due process” because she had the opportunity to 
schedule a hearing and because “[t]he period of forty-five 
days during which [the County] concluded its [abuse] 
investigation was not an overly lengthy deprivation of the 
Natural Mother’s status as primary custodian pending the 
completion of the investigation.”  (Id. at 36-37.)  While the 
District Court was right to consider the degree to which the 
order intruded upon Mother’s rights in ascertaining what 
process was due under the circumstances, see Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 335 (instructing courts to consider “the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action”), we cannot agree 
with its conclusion that Mother received due process. 
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Even if Mathews’s flexible standard permitted less 
process here than in a case where the state takes custody of a 
child – and that is a question on which we express no opinion 
at this time – that would not mean that no hearing was needed 
to address the deprivation effected by the removal of 
Daughter from Mother’s custody.  The deprivation of a 
parent’s custodial relationship with a child is among the most 
drastic actions that a state can take against an individual’s 
liberty interest, with profound ramifications for the integrity 
of the family unit and for each member of it.  From the 
parent’s perspective, there may be little meaningful difference 
between instances in which the state removes a child and 
takes her into state custody and those in which the state shifts 
custody from one parent to another, as occurred here.  In 
either case, the government has implicated a fundamental 
liberty interest of the parent who loses custody.  The state has 
caused a deprivation and risks having done so wrongly.  See 
id. (noting “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” must be 
considered).  Therefore, assuming the “fiscal and 
administrative burdens,” id., of affording such parents a 
prompt post-removal hearing do not outweigh the need for 
one – and it is hard to imagine when they would – such a 
hearing ought to be held.30
                                              
30 It seems plain that requiring a prompt post-removal 
hearing would not impose a substantial administrative or 
financial burden upon the government in this case, primarily 
because such a hearing is already required whenever a county 
agency petitions the court for a finding of dependency.  See 
supra note 
  Cf. Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 
976, 985 (7th Cir. 2002) (“When the state removes a child 
11 and accompanying text. 
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from her parents, due process guarantees prompt and fair 
post-deprivation judicial review.” (emphasis added)).   
 
It is no adequate response to say, as the District Court 
did and as the County continues to argue, that Mother was 
given an opportunity to be heard because she filed a habeas 
petition on her own and received a hearing in connection with 
that.  Some courthouse somewhere may be open to someone 
aggressive and knowledgeable enough to initiate legal action, 
but that does not meet the state’s burden of providing an 
“opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner” to a parent deprived of custody, 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted), particularly when, as here, no notice was ever 
given as to how a hearing could be scheduled and the hearing 
occurred 40 days after Daughter’s removal.31
 
  Cf. Berman, 
291 F.3d at 985 (referring to “prompt and fair post-
deprivation judicial review”).  Nor is it sufficient that 
Mother’s custodial rights were eventually addressed after 
Eller’s abuse investigation was concluded.  The constitutional 
deprivation at issue at this point is Daughter’s initial removal 
from Mother’s home, so being heard much later, after the 
deprivation, fails to address the harm.   
                                              
31 Because it is uncontested that Appellees failed to 
initiate a post-removal hearing in this case, we need not, and 
do not, opine on the precise contours of the process that 
Mother was due.  Speaking generally, however, it should be 
obvious that a hearing 40 days later is not sufficiently prompt.  
The delay should ordinarily be measured in hours or days, not 
weeks.    
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Of course, “[t]he right to familial integrity … does not 
include a right to remain free from child abuse 
investigations.”  Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125.  However, in view 
of the extremely important liberty interests at stake here, due 
process required the County to offer Mother a chance to be 
promptly heard after they took Daughter from her home, 
regardless of whether or not state law independently imposed 
that obligation.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (the question of “what process is 
due” is a matter of constitutional law, not state law (citation 
and internal quotation marks)).  And because there is no 
dispute about the historical fact that Mother was not offered 
the post-removal hearing to which she was constitutionally 
entitled, we agree with Mother that the District Court should 
have determined that the County violated her right to 
procedural due process.32
                                              
32 Had the County acted pursuant to a “protective 
custody order,” rather than via an order transferring custody 
between parents, its failure to provide a prompt hearing may 
have also violated Pennsylvania law.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 6324(1) (permitting the state to take a child into 
custody pursuant to “a protective custody order removing a 
child from the home of the parent, guardian, or custodian” if 
the courts determines “that to allow the child to remain in the 
home is contrary to the welfare of the child”).  As described 
above, see supra note 11, Pennsylvania law requires that an 
informal hearing be held if protective custody is maintained 
for longer than 72 hours. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6315(d).  
Here, however, the County never claimed to be taking 
Daughter into protective custody, and it transferred Daughter 
to Father’s care well before 72 hours had elapsed. 
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That, however, does not end our inquiry, because we 
must also determine whether that due process irregularity 
resulted in some damage.  See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 
264 (1978) (holding that a plaintiff asserting a procedural due 
process claim under § 1983 must introduce proof of damages 
arising from the alleged due process violation in order to 
recover actual damages).  The County argues that it did not, 
claiming that regardless of “the sufficiency of the process 
granted … plaintiffs [cannot] demonstrate that such process 
would have borne a different result.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 29.)  
Thus, the County says, the District Court appropriately 
entered judgment in its favor.  That is mistaken.   
 
If nothing else, the violation of Mother’s right to 
procedural due process would be a basis for awarding 
nominal damages.  See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 (“[W]e believe 
that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable 
for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”); 
Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 
1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Even when one does not prove any 
compensable damages from a due process violation, under 
Section 1983 a cause of action and nominal damages remain 
available.”).  More importantly, however, there could be a 
finding of actual damages.   
 
The County is blind to that prospect.  It asks us to hold 
that no rational jury could conclude that a post-removal 
hearing would have made a difference, because, as the 
County sees it, no one could think the underlying facts are the 
least ambiguous: Mother was starving Daughter, and that’s 
that.  But Daughter was weighed on May 5 and May 8, 
immediately after having been in Mother’s care, and those 
weights demonstrated a noteworthy improvement in her 
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condition.  For that very reason, Dr. Lindblad testified that he 
likely “would have waited until another opportunity to 
examine [Daughter] before calling the ChildLine,” if he had 
been aware of the May 5, 2006 weight of “22 pounds, 2 
ounces.”  (Joint App. at 369.)  Another expert wondered why 
Daughter was removed, since she had shown meaningful 
improvement while in Mother’s then-recent custody.  (See id. 
at 695 (“It is unclear to me why the child was removed on a 
day when she showed significant weight gain for the first 
time while under the mother’s care.”).)  Daughter’s May 5 
and May 8 weights could have come to light if a post-removal 
hearing had been conducted,33 and, given the significance of 
those weights, a reviewing judge may have ordered Daughter 
to be returned to Mother’s custody if the judge accepted 
Mother’s account of how the weigh-ins were conducted.34
                                              
33 Appellees have not directed us to any evidence that 
the May 5 and May 8 weights were brought to Judge Cascio’s 
attention at the hearing on Mother’s habeas corpus petition, 
and we have found none in the appellate record.  Even if the 
new weights were discussed at that hearing, we would not 
necessarily reject Mother’s claim to damages, as the primary 
issue at that hearing was not whether Daughter’s removal was 
appropriate but, rather, whether the state had an obligation to 
conduct a post-removal hearing under the CPSL, given that 
Daughter had not been taken into state custody.   
  In 
34 There are serious questions as to whether the May 5 
and May 8 weights were valid results.  Our dissenting 
colleague indicates that Daughter must have been clothed 
when she weighed in at 22 pounds, 2 ounces because Eller 
made that first-hand observation on May 5.  (see Dissent at 13 
(arguing that Daughter “was clothed during [the May 5] 
weigh-in”).)  So do Appellees, relying on Eller’s testimony 
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short, it is not obvious that the custody determinations would 
have been the same, had the information regarding the May 5 
and May 8 weights been fully aired. 
 
The only remaining question, then, is whether the 
County is accountable to Mother for whatever damages a jury 
finds she sustained as a result of that constitutional 
                                                                                                     
that Daughter was clothed when she was weighed on May 5 
and May 8.  If a jury accepts that testimony, as the dissent 
does, it may find that Mother suffered no damages in 
connection with the procedural due process violation 
committed here.  However, despite any suggestion to the 
contrary, that testimony is not uncontroverted; Daughter’s 
medical record from Berlin Pediatrics lists those weights, and 
the only indication that Daughter was clothed was added by 
Eller herself.  See supra note 17.  That Berlin Pediatrics 
recorded Daughter’s weights as having increased is 
undisputed.  Eller’s notation and testimony are disputed, 
however, as a physician from that practice testified that it was 
the “standard practice” to weigh a child such as Daughter 
“without … clothes.”  (Joint App. at 371.)  Although that 
physician did not observe Daughter being weighed on May 5 
or May 8, we disagree with the dissent’s implicit conclusion 
that the physician’s testimony about the way the clinic 
conducted weigh-ins could not be accepted by a rational jury 
and lead the jury to then question Eller’s account of how the 
May 5 and May 8 weights were taken.  (See Dissent at 13 
(noting that the doctor “never challenged Eller’s testimony 
that, in essence, his protocol was not followed on that 
occasion”).)  We do not imply how this factual dispute ought 
to be resolved; we only note that the dispute exists. 
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violation.35
 
  With respect to municipalities such as the 
County, that inquiry turns on whether the due process 
violation was a result of the County’s “policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”  Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978).  A policy is a decision of a municipality’s “duly 
constituted legislative body” or of “officials whose acts may 
fairly be said to be those of the municipality.”  Bd. of the 
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-
04 (1997).  A custom is a practice that, although “not … 
formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker … is so 
widespread as to have the force of law.”  Id. at 404.  “In either 
of these cases, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a 
policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through 
acquiescence, for the custom.”  Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990); see Chambers ex rel. 
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 
193 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).   
Although the record does not support a conclusion that 
the County has a formal policy against providing hearings for 
parents such as Mother, the evidence does demonstrate, as the 
County essentially admits in its briefing (see Appellees’ Br. at 
23 (referring to the County’s “Summary and Order 
procedure”)), that, amidst abuse allegations, the County has a 
custom of removing children from a parent’s home without 
conducting a prompt post-removal hearing if another parent 
                                              
35 As discussed above, see supra Part III.A, we 
conclude that Eller and Barth are absolutely immune from 
liability relating to the failure to afford Mother a prompt post-
removal hearing. 
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can take custody.  Hunt, the Assistant Director of Somerset 
County Children and Youth Services, testified that the 
procedure employed to remove Daughter from Mother’s 
custody without a hearing is utilized in circumstances in 
which there is a “fit-and-willing parent” to be “given the right 
by the court to care for the child.”  (Joint App. at 330.)  
Douglas Walters, a caseworker supervisor at Somerset 
County Children and Youth Services, elaborated that the 
process is used several times each year, explaining that 
caseworkers at the agency would know they could “obtain an 
order to stop contact until [the agency] could investigate” in a 
case such as Mother’s (id. at 339-340), because they would be 
informed of that option “through discussions and meetings, 
ongoing meetings, … with the[ir] supervisors,” (id. at 340).   
 
Thus, while the relevant policymaker is not readily 
apparent,36
                                              
36 “The question of who is a ‘policymaker’ is a 
question of state law,” to be addressed by a court, not a jury, 
in “determin[ing] which official has final, unreviewable 
discretion to make a decision or take an action.”  Andrews, 
895 F.2d at 1481.  Here, the District Court never determined 
who the relevant policymaker was, since it simply determined 
that Mother’s constitutional rights were not violated.  
Although we think it likely that Hunt would qualify as a 
policymaker for Monell purposes, the record and briefing is 
not sufficient to enable us to definitively answer that question 
in the first instance.  We need not direct the District Court to 
consider that issue afresh on remand, however, because while 
“the identification of those officials whose decisions represent 
the official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a 
legal question to be resolved by the trial judge,” Jett v. Dallas 
 the evidence shows conclusively that, when a non-
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custodial parent is available to take a child, it is customary for 
the County to temporarily suspend the other parent’s custody 
rights without a hearing, when abuse is suspected.  That 
custom was utilized with official approbation in this case.  
And, because there is no question that what the County calls 
its “Summary and Order procedure” (Appellees’ Br. at 23) 
violated Mother’s right to a prompt post-removal hearing, we 
conclude that the County is liable under § 1983 for whatever 
damages a jury may deem appropriate to redress that 
violation.  See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (stating that 
liability attaches “only when execution of a government’s 
policy or custom … inflicts the injury” (citation omitted)).  
 
 2. Other Due Process Claims Against the  
   County 
 
We now briefly turn to Mother’s second procedural 
due process claim against the County, which arises from 
Eller’s ex parte report of the child abuse investigation to 
Judge Cascio on June 23, 2006, and to her substantive due 
process claim.  There is no evidence supporting § 1983 
liability against the County for either claim.  Mother does not 
allege that the June 23, 2006 meeting with Judge Cascio was 
                                                                                                     
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989), Appellees’ 
effective admission of a custom obviates any need to have a 
court “determine, by reference to local law, which … officials 
had final policymaking authority,” Simmons v. City of Phila., 
947 F.2d 1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991) (Becker, J., concurring); 
cf. id. at 1089 n.1 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (“I do agree … 
with Judge Becker’s conclusion … that the City waived its 
claim that plaintiff failed to identify the responsible 
[policymaker] … .”). 
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made pursuant to any policy or custom.  Lacking such 
evidence, we must conclude that the District Court was 
correct in holding that the County is not liable under § 1983 
for any alleged constitutional harm arising from that meeting.  
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).  
Similarly, Mother’s substantive due process claim focuses 
entirely on Eller’s conduct, alleging that her “concoct[ion] 
[of] facts” and “manipulation of evidence” to effectuate 
Daughter’s removal was so egregious that it “shocks the 
conscience.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 52-53.)  Because 
Mother provides no evidence that the County had a policy or 
custom endorsing such behavior, if it occurred, we agree with 
the District Court that the County is entitled to summary 
judgment on the substantive due process claim as well.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court’s order.  We affirm the 
District Court’s order to the extent it awarded judgment in 
favor of Eller and Barth on the procedural due process claims; 
awarded judgment to all Appellees on the substantive due 
process claims; and awarded judgment  to the County on the 
procedural due process claim as it relates to the June 23 
meeting.  We reverse the District Court’s denial of summary 
judgment to Appellant on her procedural due process claim 
against the County for its violation of her right to a post-
removal hearing, and we remand this case for a trial on the 
damages associated with that violation. 
 B. S., and B.S. as guardian and parent of T.S., G.S., and N.S., 
v. Somerset County; Somerset County Children and Youth 
Services; Jessica Eller; Julie Barth, No. 11-1833. 
 
Nygaard, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 
  I agree with the majority that the May 5, 2006 
meeting between Eller and Judge Cascio violated procedural 
due process, and that the County is liable for this violation.  I 
also agree that caseworkers Eller and Barth are immune from 
liability on this issue.  I write separately because I disagree 
with the majority on the type of immunity that should be 
extended to Eller and Barth, and because I differ on the scope 
of the procedural due process remand.   
 
 As to the June 23, 2006 ex parte meeting, I conclude 
that Eller violated procedural due process, and I would not 
grant her any immunity on this claim.  Nonetheless, I would 
instruct the District Court to award only nominal damages.   
 
 Finally, I agree with the majority that B.S.’s 
substantive due process claim regarding M.N.’s initial 
removal from B.S.’s house does not have any merit.  
However, I reach the same conclusion on all of B.S.’s 
substantive due process claims.  As a result, I do not find any 
error in the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 
these claims. 
 
May 5, 2006 Ex Parte Meeting 
   Absolute Immunity  
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 In light of our long tradition of reluctance to extend the 
scope of immunity, I would not adopt the District Court’s 
broad interpretation of  Ernst as to the May 5, 2006 meeting 
between Jessica Eller and Judge Cascio, applying absolute 
immunity anytime a court order has been issued, regardless of 
the context in which the order came about.  I agree that a 
functional analysis is appropriate to assess whether it is 
proper to extend absolute immunity, but we must take care to 
provide such immunity only where it is clear that it comports 
with the larger concerns of procedural due process. 
 
 As the Supreme Court said:   
Advocates are restrained not only 
by their professional obligations, 
but by the knowledge that their 
assertions will be contested by 
their adversaries in open court. 
Jurors are carefully screened to 
remove all possibility of bias. 
Witnesses are, of course, subject 
to the rigors of cross-examination 
and the penalty of perjury. 
Because these features of the 
judicial process tend to enhance 
the reliability of information and 
the impartiality of the 
decisionmaking process, there is a 
less pressing need for individual 
suits to correct constitutional 
error. 
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Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).  When a child 
welfare worker functions in the nature of a prosecutor in the 
context of a judicial process that provides for cross-
examination and rebuttal (eliminating the need for collateral 
litigation to challenge the caseworkers conduct), the full array 
of considerations appropriate to absolute immunity are 
addressed.   That is the significance, in Ernst, of our grant of 
absolute immunity to caseworkers in the context of 
dependency proceedings, a limitation ensuring that the parties 
and the court have ample opportunities to scrutinize the 
caseworker’s conduct, decisions and recommendations.  
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 497; see also Juvenile Act (42 Pa.C.S. § 
6324(1)); see also Child Protective Services Act (23 Pa.C.S. § 
6315(a)(1)). 
 
 For this reason, I cannot accept the majority’s 
affirmation of the District Court’s formula for providing 
absolute immunity—essentially applying anytime a court is 
involved.  It provides an overbroad standard that does not 
comport with fundamental concerns underlying absolute 
immunity.  Although Eller’s and Barth’s conduct and 
conclusions were placed before a judge in a summary 
proceeding, their decisions and actions occurred within a 
process structured to ensure that they were never going to be 
subjected to cross examination or rebuttal.  This is 
fundamentally at odds with our long-standing concern to 
extend absolute immunity only where procedural due process 
is available.  Yet, my difficulty with the majority’s conclusion 
goes far deeper. 
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said:  
“[S]tate law must authorize the prosecutorial or judicial 
function to which absolute immunity attaches.”  Chalkboard, 
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Inc. v. Brandt,  902 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1989).  I agree.  
In Chalkboard, the Court denied absolute immunity to state 
actors, ruling that the Arizona Department of Health Services 
was not acting within the “role assigned to it by state law” 
when it summarily closed a day care center.  Id.  The majority 
broadly analogizes Eller’s and Barth’s decisions and actions 
to those of a prosecutor both because they seem to fall in the 
category of functioning as a state advocate, and also because 
Eller interacted with the state court.   But, even if we ignore 
the pro forma and insular nature of the interaction between 
Eller and Judge Cascio that call the prosecutorial analogy into 
question, a closer analysis reveals that Eller did not have any 
statutory authorization to approach the judge to request this 
particular order. 
 
 The starting point for understanding the state’s 
authority in child welfare cases is the dependency process.  
“Before interfering with a parent's care and control of a child 
and ordering the intervention of an agency of the state, a court 
must first determine that the child is dependent.”  In Interest 
of Theresa E., 429 A.2d 1150, 1155 (Pa. Super. 1981), citing 
42 Pa.C.S. § 6341.  However, in an emergency, a dependency 
determination is not necessary.1
                                              
1 The Pennsylvania Superior Court said:  “in a dependency 
proceeding, a court may grant custody of an allegedly 
dependent child to that child’s non-custodial parent without 
first declaring the child dependent as long as sufficient 
evidence of dependency exists.”  In Interest of Justin S., 543 
A.2d 1192, 1198 n.2 (1988).  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court went further, stating that “where a non-custodial parent 
is ready, willing, and able to provide adequate care to a child, 
  The Child Protective 
Services Law states the following:   
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A child may be taken into 
custody:  (1) Pursuant to an order 
of the court under this chapter.  
Prior to entering a protective 
custody order removing a child 
from the home of the parent, 
guardian or custodian, the court 
must determine that to allow the 
child to remain in the home is 
contrary to the welfare of the 
child.  (2) Pursuant to the laws of 
arrest.  (3) By a law enforcement 
officer or duly authorized officer 
of the court if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the child is 
suffering from illness or injury or 
is in imminent danger from his 
surroundings, and that his 
removal is necessary.  (4) By a 
law enforcement officer or duly 
authorized officer of the court if 
there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the child has run 
away from his parents, guardian, 
or other custodian.  (5) By a law 
enforcement officer or duly 
authorized officer of the court if 
there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the child has violated 
                                                                                                     
a court may not adjudge that child dependent.”  In re M.L., 
562 A.2D 46, 650 (2000).    
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conditions of his probation.  
 
42 Pa.C.S. § 6324 (emphasis added).  A treating physician or 
director of a hospital can take a child into protective custody 
for up to 24 hours if they determine a child to be in immediate 
danger.  23 Pa.C.S. §6315(1).  After 24 hours, a county 
agency must get an order to authorize an extension of the 
protective custody.  Id. 
   
 Somerset County, Eller and Barth say that they did not 
take M.N. into protective custody, nor did they ask the court 
to commence a dependency proceeding to determine the 
status of the child.  Instead, they say, they were merely 
transferring custody between parents.  As they were keen to 
note throughout their argument, this distinction goes far 
beyond mere semantics because by seeking this order—unlike 
a protective custody order—they avoided all hearing 
requirements.   
 
 The Child Protective Services Law states that “[i]n no 
case shall protective custody under this chapter be maintained 
longer than 72 hours without an informal hearing under 42 
Pa.C.S. § 6332.”  23 Pa.C.S. § 6315.  The hearing is held to 
determine:   
 
whether [the child’s] detention or 
shelter care is required under 
section 6325 (relating to detention 
of child), whether to allow the 
child to remain in the home would 
be contrary to the welfare of the 
child . . . [and] [i]f the child is 
alleged to be a dependent child, 
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the court or master shall also 
determine whether reasonable 
efforts were made to prevent such 
placement or, in the case of an 
emergency placement where 
services were not offered and 
could not have prevented the 
necessity of placement, whether 
this level of effort was reasonable 
due to the emergency nature of 
the situation, safety considerations 
and circumstances of the family. 
 
42 Pa.C.S. § 6332.  I conclude from this that the state has 
statutory authority to seek an order removing the child from a 
parent under two circumstances:  following a court’s 
determination of dependency; and through the mechanism of 
a protective custody order where the child is in imminent 
danger of harm.  Appellees did neither of the above, 
removing the child under an order that merely transferred 
custody between parents.   Again, in this case, the difference 
goes beyond mere semantics, since appellees viewed what 
they were doing as fundamentally different from the process 
established in the statutes.   This, according to their own 
argument, is why their conduct did not need to be subjected to 
the same scrutiny that is dictated in the statutory processes.  
They were not initiating a dependency process, nor were they 
seeking a protective custody order.  Rather, they were merely 
initiating a custody process between parents.  They were 
functioning, therefore, in a different capacity.  This is where 
the problem arises.   
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 Pennsylvania law says the following regarding 
standing to bring custody actions.  
  
The following individuals may 
file an action under this chapter 
for any form of physical custody 
or legal custody:  (1) A parent of 
the child.   (2) A person who 
stands in loco parentis to the 
child.  (3) A grandparent of the 
child who is not in loco parentis 
to the child: (i) whose relationship 
with the child began either with 
the consent of a parent of the 
child or under a court order; (ii) 
who assumes or is willing to 
assume responsibility for the 
child; and (iii) when one of the 
following conditions is met: (A) 
the child has been determined to 
be a dependent child under 42 
Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to 
juvenile matters); (B) the child is 
substantially at risk due to 
parental abuse, neglect, drug or 
alcohol abuse or incapacity; or 
(C) the child has, for a period of 
at least 12 consecutive months, 
resided with the grandparent, 
excluding brief temporary 
absences of the child from the 
home, and is removed from the 
home by the parents, in which 
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case the action must be filed 
within six months after the 
removal of the child from the 
home.  
 
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324.  The state is not given standing to, sua 
sponte, initiate court proceedings solely to alter the custody 
between parents.  The problem is that by seeking a custody 
order rather than a protective custody order, they functioned 
outside of the statutory structure of the Child Protective 
Services Law and the Juvenile Act, and more important for 
immunity analysis, outside of their statutory authority. 2
   
   The 
state has a broad mandate to protect children from abuse, but 
it must secure their safety in a manner that is consistent with 
their statutory authority.  To receive the benefits of absolute 
immunity, child welfare workers, like prosecutors, must act 
within the confines of their legal authority.  By stepping 
beyond this boundary, even if they were functioning 
prosecutorially, they crossed a bright line and placed 
themselves  outside of the protective umbrella of absolute 
immunity. 
                                              
2 Pennsylvania courts have been careful to distinguish 
dependency proceedings from custody actions.  “This Court 
has stated strong disapproval of the use of a dependency 
proceeding as a means of transferring custody of a child from 
one parent to another.”   In re A.E., 722 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998); citing Helsel v. Blair County Children and 
Youth Services, 519 A.2d 456, 460 (Pa.Super.1986);  In the 
Matter of Mark T., 442 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa.Super.1982) 
(Beck, J. concurring).  
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 Therefore, for all of the above reasons, I disagree with 
the majority and conclude that it is not proper to extend 
absolute immunity to Eller and Barth for B.S.’s procedural 
due process claim arising from the May 5, 2006 ex parte 
meeting. 3
 
   
Qualified Immunity for the May 5, 2006 Meeting 
 I would, instead, affirm the District Court’s alternative 
ruling that Eller and Barth should receive qualified immunity.  
The qualified immunity analysis is focused on the “‘objective 
legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the 
legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was 
taken.’” Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  This ‘“gives ample room for mistaken judgments 
by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.’”  Id. (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 
F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2005)).  The analysis is objective, but 
still requires that we take into account the context in which 
                                              
3 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the 
caseworkers were not requesting the court to “prosecute” 
anything:  they were not seeking a court declaration regarding 
the status of the child, nor were they asking the court to 
adjudicate anything about B.S.’s conduct.  Rather, they were 
merely attempting to unilaterally change the custody 
arrangement between the parents.   Denying absolute 
immunity here is consistent with our recognition that such 
immunity requires “meticulous analysis” of a prosecutor’s 
actions.  Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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Eller and Barth acted.  Therefore, we must consider a number 
of factors. 
   
 First, Pennsylvania’s legal landscape is somewhat 
confusing.  As I noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court said the following:  
 
[I]t is the duty of the trial court to 
determine whether the non-
custodial parent is capable and 
willing to render proper parental 
control prior to adjudicating a 
child dependent. If the court 
determines that the custodial 
parent is unable to provide proper 
parental care and control “at this 
moment” and that the non-
custodial parent is “immediately 
available” to provide such care, 
the child is not dependent under 
the provisions of the Juvenile Act. 
Consequently, the court must 
grant custody of the allegedly 
dependent child to the non-
custodial parent. Once custody is 
granted to the non-custodial 
parent, “the care, protection, and 
wholesome mental and physical 
development of the child” can 
occur in a family environment as 
the purpose of the Juvenile Act 
directs. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).   
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In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis added) 
(quoting In Interest of Justin S., 543 A.2d 1192, 1200 (Pa. 
Super. 1988)).   I read this provision as dictating a particular 
result after a dependency action has been commenced.  Yet, 
fairly read, this holding creates the impression that, in 
circumstances like that of B.S., a post-deprivation hearing 
would be, at best, perfunctory. 
 
 Second, the County argued that In re ML and the 
Pennsylvania statutes made the dependency process 
inapplicable to their summary and order procedure.4
                                              
4 I am also aware of the pervasive concern for acting in the 
best interest of the child.  
  As a 
result, I query whether there existed a sufficiently confusing 
environment that would cause a reasonable caseworker to 
mistakenly conclude that a post-deprivation hearing was not 
required here.  I conclude that this is the case.  See O'Brien v. 
City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“The policy, practice, or custom was taught by a national 
authority on the management of critical incidents, a person 
upon whom it was not unreasonable to rely. The officers’ 
response, which did not vary from the policy, practice, or 
custom, entitles them to qualified immunity.”).  Although the 
right to a post-deprivation hearing is deeply embedded in our 
society, we cannot expect caseworkers to parse state supreme 
court precedent and interpret state law in a way that is 
contrary to an accepted agency custom.  In light of the 
confusing legal landscape that exists, it was not unreasonable 
for Barth and Eller to rely upon an established agency custom 
to guide their handling of the case.  For this reason I conclude 
that the District Court properly determined that Eller and 
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Barth have qualified immunity and are protected from section 
1983 liability for the failure to provide B.S. with a post-
deprivation hearing. 
 
Remand on Damages for the May 5, 2006 Meeting 
 
 I also disagree with the scope of the majority’s remand 
regarding the County’s liability on the procedural due process 
violation arising from the May 5, 2006 meeting.  I concur 
with their conclusion that nominal damages are substantiated, 
but disagree that further damages may be appropriate.  The 
majority concluded that there was a factual dispute about 
M.N.’s weight on the day that the County removed her from 
B.S.’s custody.  I see no such dispute. 
 
 My disagreement with the majority is focused upon a 
single point of reference in the record:  M.N.’s weight on 
May 5, 2006, the day she was removed from B.S.’s house.  
There is no dispute that the records specify M.N.’s weight on 
that day as 22 pounds, 2 ounces.  However, Eller, who was 
present at the medical exam on that day, stated that M.N. was 
clothed during this weigh-in.  No one disputes this, nor do 
they dispute the fact that prior weights were taken when the 
child was not clothed.   
    
 M.N.’s pediatrician testified only that, in his practice, 
children were usually weighed without clothes.  Yet, he was 
not present for M.N.’s weigh-in on May 5, 2006 and, 
significantly, he never challenged Eller’s testimony that, in 
essence, his protocol was not followed on that occasion.  It is 
axiomatic that, in the absence of any challenge to Eller’s 
factual statement, B.S. failed to create a factual dispute.   
14 
 
 B.S.’s argument, therefore, is that the court would not 
have ordered M.N.’s removal, or would have immediately 
returned M.N. to her, if she had been able to present this 
weight to the court—even though the weight was taken while 
M.N. was clothed.  In light of the Dr. Lindblad’s diagnosis 
and report, 5 and other information before the court at that 
time, I do not regard such an inference as reasonable.6
                                              
5 At deposition, B.S. presented Dr. Lindblad with a 
hypothetical in which M.N.’s weight was actually 22 pounds, 
2 ounces on May 5.  Under this hypothetical, Lindblad stated 
that, while failure to thrive diagnoses are based upon a trend 
of data rather than a discreet data point, he would have to take 
this information into account before deciding on a failure to 
thrive diagnosis.  Yet, as with M.N.’s pediatrician, B.S. never 
asked Dr. Lindblad to consider the actual data that included 
the weight of M.N.’s clothes.  Lindblad never commented on 
the real data.  (Interestingly, however, Linblad detected that 
the hypothetical was flawed because he stated that such a 
hypothetical weight would have been highly suspect to him 
because it diverged so greatly from M.N.’s prior growth.)  
The majority’s use of Lindblad’s testimony to suggest that he 
retracted his diagnosis and ChildLine complaint diverges 
from fact.   
  For 
 
6 B.S. fails to raise a dispute of material fact about the 
fundamental assertion made in Eller’s summary that she 
presented to the court:  Dr. Lindblad diagnosed M.N. with 
psycho-social failure to thrive due to chronic low weight gain 
that, from clinical observation of both M.N. and B.S., likely 
was caused by B.S.’s conduct.  The court’s decision to 
remove M.N. from B.S.’s custody was ultimately based on 
this observation and diagnosis.  Nothing stated in any of the 
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this reason, I conclude that there is no basis to send the issue 
of damages to a jury.  I would, instead, remand with 
instruction for the District Court to award nominal damages. 
 
June 23, 2006 Ex Parte Meeting7
                                                                                                     
reports of the doctors or caseworker specifically addresses, 
much less refutes, any of this.   Moreover, clarification of 
Eller’s reference to 19 pounds would not have materially 
changed anything.  This is so because, even if B.S. could have 
produced credible evidence of a different weight—the 
weights taken, for instance, by either of the two physicians 
who examined M.N. in late April—the evidence would still 
have supported a conclusion that M.N. was severely 
underweight while under the care of B.S. 
 
 
7 In a footnote, B.S. generally states that Eller’s decisions 
“had to have the approval of her supervisor and Agency 
policy-makers before it could be extended.”  Yet, as to the 
June 23, 2006 meeting, B.S. failed to detail any specific 
challenge to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Barth.  
I am aware that, under section 1983, “a supervisor may be 
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in 
violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, 
or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in [their] subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. 
J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372 
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004);  see also Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2010).  In this 
case, however, B.S.’s failure to raise a specific challenge as to 
Barth waives the issue of the District Court’s decision 
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 As to the June 23, 2006 meeting between Eller and 
Judge Cascio, I disagree with the majority that there is any 
basis to extend absolute immunity to Eller on the procedural 
due process claim.  Like the May 5 meeting, even if I agreed 
that the conduct can be analogized as prosecutorial, Eller had 
no authority to approach the court to propose another custody 
order.  As a result, there is no basis for absolute immunity.    
  
Qualified Immunity 
My disagreement with the majority on the June 23 
meeting goes further in that I would not extend even qualified 
immunity to Eller.  As I noted in the discussion of the May 5, 
2006 meeting, the constitutional protection against ex parte 
meetings is well-established.  I concluded that qualified 
immunity was due in that instance, however, because of the 
combination of a confusing legal landscape and a County 
custom that misguided the caseworkers actions.  Yet, for the 
June 23, 2006 meeting, there was no applicable County 
custom.  This, to me, is decisive.  Eller, acting in discernibly 
non-emergency circumstances, made the decision to meet ex 
parte with Judge Cascio on June 23.  There is no evidence to 
suggest that Eller did so at the behest of any County 
authority, nor was she ordered to do so by the court.  
Therefore, I must conclude that she acted on her own.  
Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that Eller made a 
reasonable mistake by approaching Judge Cascio ex parte.  
                                                                                                     
granting qualified immunity to Barth for liability arising from 
the June 23, 2006 meeting with the court.   
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Nonetheless, as with the May 5, 2006 ex parte meeting, I 
would award only nominal damages because there is no 
reasonable basis to infer that the outcome of the meeting 
would have been different if B.S. had been given the 
opportunity to confront the evidence. 
 
 As with the May 5 meeting, the inquiry on the June 23 
meeting focuses on whether B.S.’s inability to confront 
information provided at the meeting prejudiced the outcome.8
                                              
8 Eller gave the court the summary and proposed order, 
neither of which provided any details about the investigation.  
The summary stated only that upon completion of its 
investigation regarding serious physical neglect, “[t]he CY-48 
was filed on June 19, 2006 with Childline and substantiated 
[B.S.], the natural mother, as the perpetrator.”  The proposed 
order stated only that “due to the indicated report of serious 
physical neglect whereby B.S. is the perpetrator, it is hereby 
ordered . . . .”  Nonetheless, by the time of the second hearing 
the County had completed its CY-48 investigation, 
determining that Lindblad’s accusation of child neglect by 
B.S. was “indicated.”  B.S. plainly disputes the conclusion of 
the summary given to the court and disagrees with the 
custody recommendation, but the focus of her challenge is 
with information that is contained in or left out of the CY-48.  
For the sake of summary judgment—since the report was 
filed before the hearing—I would assume that B.S. had an 
opportunity to read it and formulate the objections that she 
voices in this appeal.  Moreover, I would presume that her 
presence at the June 23 meeting would have provided her 
with a forum to raise numerous issues with the investigation.   
  
Yet, as I noted in my analysis of injury arising from B.S.’s 
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other procedural due process claim, I do not find any 
reasonable basis for the District Court to have inferred that 
the state court would have made a decision more favorable to 
B.S. based upon the weight record from the May 5 doctor 
appointment.  The state court’s ignorance of this record was 
of no moment.  The same reasoning applies here.9
 
  
 As to the May 8 weight record, according to Eller, the 
natural father reported the child was also clothed during this 
weigh-in.  However, even were we to disregard Eller’s 
undisputed testimony here because she was not physically 
present at the examination, I note that this weight was taken 
after M.N had been in the custody and care of her natural 
father for three days.  As a result, it would not have been 
reasonable for the District Court to construe this weight 
record as evidence favorable to B.S.’s claims of constitutional 
harm, since –objectively—it arose from the period of time in 
which the natural father, not B.S., had custody of M.N.  
  
 We are required to make only reasonable inferences at 
summary judgment. 
 
Because B.S.’s issues with the CY-48 are predicated 
on the May 5 and May 8 weights, weights that do not support 
B.S.’s claims, I must conclude that all of the issues that B.S. 
raises regarding the report are baseless.  Therefore, lacking 
any reasonable challenge to Eller’s recommendation, there is 
no evidentiary support for actual prejudice arising from the 
                                              
9 There is no evidence that this record was actually submitted 
with the CY-48.  For purposes of summary judgment, I 
presume that it was. 
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June 23 meeting between Eller and the state court and, 
therefore, no evidence of actual, compensable, harm.  Yet, as 
with the May 5, 2006 procedural due process violation, I 
would remand to the District Court with instructions to award 
nominal damages.  
 
Substantive Due Process Claim10
 As to the substantive due process claim, I agree with 
the majority that, as to B.S.’s substantive due process claims 
arising from M.N.’s removal, no reasonable fact-finder could 
rule that Eller’s actions shock the conscience.  I differ from 
both of my colleagues, however, in reaching the same 
conclusion for all of B.S.’s substantive due process claims.  I, 
therefore, do not reach the issue of absolute immunity on this 
issue. 
 
 
 Eller acted originally upon the report of one of M.N.’s 
attending physicians, who had sustained contact with both 
M.N. and B.S. over a period of time.  Moreover, the 
physician’s suspicions of serious neglect arose from 
observations he made that were grounded in his field of 
medical expertise.  Eller’s subsequent investigation gathered 
a large amount of data, which provided a very consistent 
description of M.N. as one who was severely underweight 
while under the care of B.S. and who gained weight 
appropriately while under the care and supervision of others.  
Finally, while the weight of 22 pounds, 2 ounces is, 
                                              
10 I agree with the majority that that B.S. waived the 
substantive due process issue as to Barth and the County. 
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technically, over the threshold for a failure to thrive 
diagnosis, the margin by which it exceeds it is extremely 
slight.  Additionally, the weight from May 5 (and the May 8 
weight) is a notable outlier when charted with all of M.N.’s 
recorded weights.  This is important in light of Lindblad’s 
testimony that his assessment arose from long-term patterns 
that he observed, rather than discrete data points.  Viewed in 
this larger context, even if I could have concluded that Eller 
mishandled the May 5 or May 8 weight records, her 
misstatement or misjudgments could hardly be regarded as 
egregious or conscience shocking.   
 
 B.S. attempts to tie all of the alleged errors together by 
claiming that Eller had an agenda throughout this time to 
deprive her of custody in favor of the natural father.  The 
problem, however, is that B.S. did not substantiate this 
theory.  She pointed to one possibly uncommon statement in 
the May 5 order requiring her to refrain from “badgering or 
harassing the agency staff, belitteling [sic] any service 
providers or the natural father.”  She claims that this is 
evidence that Eller had a negative view of her.  Yet, B.S. fails 
to produce any evidence from which the District Court could 
have reasonably inferred such an agenda against her, much 
less a causal link to the caseworker’s conduct.  Without this, 
her entire substantive due process claim fails. 
 
 Accordingly, I do not find any error in the District 
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Eller 
regarding B.S.’s substantive due process claims.   
